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ABSTRACT 
 
In the Fall 2007, there were landmark labor contracts agreed upon between the United 
Autoworkers (UAW) and the Big Three Automakers—General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and 
Chrysler LLC.  The impetus for these truly historic labor agreements was to afford the automakers 
to remain competitive in the global market while labor was to be protected.  Since the passage of 
these labor contracts, auto sales have continually declined to record lows due to the recession in 
the United States.  This paper will trace the major contractual provisions of these labor 
agreements and also analyze how effective they were in accomplishing the stated goals for both 
the UAW and the Big Three automakers.  Additionally, the paper will examine the necessary 
changes needed in these labor contracts if the automakers are to survive in the global economy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he Fall 2007 contract negotiations between the United Autoworkers (UAW) and the Big Three 
automakers (General Motors, Chrysler LLC, and Ford Motor) were viewed as truly historic in 
significance as both respective parties struggled to attain their goals and reach mutually agreed upon 
labor contracts (Lucas and Furdek, 2009).  Both the UAW and the Big Three automakers realized that in order to 
survive and compete successfully in the global economy, a new paradigm would be established.  The primary goal 
for the UAW was to protect labor, while the goal for the Big Three automakers was to be competitive as well as 
profitable. 
 
 Following pattern bargaining, the UAW reached agreements with General Motors, followed by Chrysler 
LLC, and concluded with the Ford Motor Company.  Each labor contract contained unprecedented provisions for 
both parties, permitting them to achieve their stated goals.  The Big Three automakers were able to reduce their 
labor and benefit costs to close the gap with its rival automakers.  On the other hand, the UAW gained work 
commitments at certain assembly facilities that protected current and future jobs for its membership.  
 
 In the GM-UAW labor agreement, a multi-dollar health-care trust fund, known as the Voluntary Employee 
Benefit Association (VEBA), was created to manage the health costs of retirees.  GM estimated that this transfer of 
retirees’ health care to the union-operated trust fund would result in a savings of $1,200 to $1,500 per car, compared 
to a car manufactured by its rival, Toyota Motor Corporation (Stoll and McCracken, 2009).  Additionally, there were 
no pay raises allocated over the four-year agreement, but rather, lump sum payments of 3%, 4%, and 3% in the last 
three years of the contract (Lucas and Furdek, 2009).  This labor contract also created a two-tier wage structure to 
provide a lower wage for newly hired workers in certain noncore jobs, as well as a 401(k) defined contribution plan 
(Lucas and Furdek, 2009).  Another significant provision of the 456-page labor agreement was job security, as GM 
committed to build current and future products at sixteen of its eighteen U.S. assembly plants (Lucas and Furdek, 
2009). 
 
Similar to the GM agreement, a multi-dollar VEBA was also established to cover the cost of health care for 
retirees in the UAW-Chrysler labor contract.  Likewise, a two-tier wage and reduced benefit system was also created 
for its new hires performing noncore jobs.  A job security provision designated a commitment from Chrysler to 
T 
American Journal of Business Education – January 2010 Volume 3, Number 1 
10 
provide work for UAW workers for at least fifty of its fifty-nine facilities (Lucas and Furdek, 2009). 
 
 In the UAW-Ford Motor Company labor agreement, a VEBA was also established to address the health 
care costs of UAW retirees.  However, the Ford Motor Company would contribute less to the retiree health trust 
fund, as compared to GM and Chrysler, because Ford was viewed, at the time, as the weakest financially of the three 
car manufacturing companies.   The labor contract also provided for a lower wage and reduced benefit package for 
all new hires performing not only noncore jobs, but also assembly line work.  A job security provision was also 
included to address a commitment from Ford Motor to have two assembly plants remain open (Lucas and Furdek, 
2009).   
 
In retrospect, all three labor agreements appeared to accomplish the goals sought by both parties that 
management was to be competitive and profitable and labor was to be protected.  At the time, both the UAW and 
Big Three automakers were to be commended for their efforts to agree upon such innovative and groundbreaking 
labor contracts in order for the American auto industry to remain viable and successfully compete.  However, there 
was a dramatic economic downturn experienced in the last quarter in 2007 and the financial crisis would 
dramatically impact the auto industry. 
 
 As a result of the global economic downturn, U.S. auto sales slumped for each of the Big Three 
automakers.  Overall, the sale of light vehicles, in 2008, was thirteen million, which represented a decline of 
eighteen percent compared to overall sales in 2007 (Denning, 2009).  For GM, the company posted a 30.9 billion 
loss in 2008 with a $9.6 billion loss alone in the fourth quarter as car sales dramatically declined (Terlap, Stoll, and 
King Jr.).  Additionally, GM experienced a seventeen percent drop in revenue compare to 2007 (Terlap, Stoll, and 
King Jr.).   
 
Similar to GM, both Chrysler LLC and Ford Motor also experienced unprecedented record lows in auto 
sales, as well as losses in revenues.  In 2008, Chrysler LLC, the 84-year old automaker, lost $8 billion as light auto 
sales tumbled (Kellogg and Dolan, 2009).  The Ford Motor Company reported a record setting loss of $14.6 billion 
in 2008 which was the worst loss reported in its 106-year history (Johnson and Krisher, 2009). 
 
As plunging auto sales continued, the Chief Executives of the Big Three automakers appealed to Congress 
for a financial bailout using taxpayer’s monies to enable the auto industry to survive.  After arduous and tumultuous 
debates in Congress, the White House agreed to $17.4 billion in bailout loans to both GM and Chrysler LLC on 
December 19, 2008. GM received $13.4 billion in U.S. loans, while Chrysler accepted $4 billion (Stoll, Terlap, and 
Kellogg, 2009).  The Ford Motor Company did not seek a bailout for it believed that it could sustain itself without 
governmental intervention. 
 
As American gross domestic product shrank sharply to 6.1% in the first quarter of 2009, the worst 
performance of the U.S. economy in over fifty years, The Big Three automakers experienced severe financial losses.  
Auto sales continued to crumble, reflecting the severity of the recession.  GM reported a $6 billion loss for the first 
quarter and its market share dipped to 18.6% (Ingrassia, 2009).  For the first quarter of 2009, GM’s revenue shrank 
47% to $22.43 billion compared to 42.38 billion in 2008.  Therefore, GM needed to use $10.2 billion in cash to 
continue its operations for the first quarter (Terlep, Stoll, and Cimilluca, 2009).  As part of the federal bailout 
agreement, on March 27, 2009, CEO Rick Wagoner Jr. agreed to resign. 
 
Both Chrysler LLC and Ford Motor also experienced financial losses of revenues resulting from the car 
industry slump.  For the first quarter, Chrysler LLC auto sales fell more than forty percent, and consequently, the 
third-largest U.S. carmaker filed for bankruptcy protection on April 30, 2009.  The Ford Motor Company reported a 
$1.4 billion loss for the first quarter, but the company maintained its position that it would not seek any type of 
government bailout (Johnson and Krisher, 2009).   
 
In retrospect, the UAW and the Big Three automakers had agreed to landmark labor contracts in the Fall 
2007.  Each labor agreement contained cost saving measures for the automakers, as well as job security provisions 
for the UAW.  At the time, the labor agreements appeared to achieve the desired goals for both parties.  The 
automakers were to remain viable and competitive, while the UAW protected jobs for its membership.  Since the 
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passage of these labor contracts, auto sales have plunged to record lows as consumers are simply not purchasing new 
vehicles due to the severity of the recession experienced in the United States.  Obviously, both the UAW and the Big 
Three Automakers could not have envisioned the severity of the recession when they negotiated these labor 
agreements.  The question remains, could these labor agreements function during this economic downturn, and if 
not, what must the UAW and the Big Three automakers do in order to survive and compete in the auto industry. 
 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
 
 As previously stated, the Ford Motor Company was viewed as the weakest of the Big Three automakers 
and was able to gain substantial labor-cost savings measures as well as a reduced benefit package in the 2007 labor 
agreement.  Due to the car industry slump, Ford Motor had experienced financial losses of revenues, but it had not 
sought any type of bailout from the government.  However, the Ford Motor Company gained additional concessions 
from the UAW in the Spring 2009.  It was estimated that these concessions would save the company $375 million in 
2009 and $500 million or more in the following years (Bennett and Terlep, 2009). 
 
 One major cost-cutting modification to the 2007 labor agreement pertained to the method that Ford funded 
the VEBA which affected approximately 187,000 retirees and spouses.  The funding change was that fifty percent of 
future cash contributions to the retiree health care fund were replaced with company stock (Dolan and Bennett, 
2009).  For Ford Motor, the total health-care liability was $13.6 billion over ten years; however, the company 
anticipated  reducing its cash obligation to 6.6 billion with this new funding (Dolan and Stoll, 2009). 
 
 Another major cost-saving measure was to lower the total pay compensation per hour of a worker.  Under 
the new contractual terms, the company lowered the total pay compensation per worker from $60 to $55 an hour 
including benefits, pensions, and bonuses.  Thus, Ford Motor moved closer to the estimated $48 an hour 
compensation per worker that Toyota Corporation and other foreign automakers paid workers at their U.S. plants 
(Bennett and Terlep, 2009).  Other major concessions included cutbacks in work rules and reduced unemployment 
benefits for laid-off workers. All of these concessions were approved by the UAW membership with forty-nine 
percent of Ford’s production workers and fifty-eight percent of the skill trade workers.  These approval percentages 
were considerably lowered than the original 2007 agreement approval percentages of eighty-one percent for the 
production workers and seventy-one percent for the skill workers (Dolan, 2009).  
 
CHRYSLER LLC 
 
 As previously discussed, Chrysler LLC was loaned $4 billion in December 2008 by the U.S. Treasury as 
part of a bailout package.  The company also requested an additional $5 billion in the Spring 2009 (Linebaugh, 
Bennett, King, and Stoll, 2009).  Similar to Ford Motor, Chrysler LLC experienced a dramatic declined in its auto 
sales.  For example, Chrysler LLC reported that its auto sales of cars and light trucks declined forty-eight percent in 
April 2009 (Bennett, 2009).  
 
 Under the prescribed conditions for the federal bailout loans, Chrysler LLC agreed to renegotiate VEBA 
and other labor cost-cutting measures with the UAW.  It was estimated that Chrysler LLC had committed to a $10 
billion contribution to VEBA; however, there was to be a contribution of both cash and stock under the terms of the 
bailout (Dolan, 2009).  These modifications to the 2007 labor pact were to reduce the company’s overall costs in 
order to avoid bankruptcy. 
 
 On April 26 2009, Chrysler LLC and the UAW announced a “concessionary agreement.”  Under the terms 
of the new agreement, Chrysler would eventually own fifty-five percent of stock in a restructured Chrysler 
company.  Additionally, Chrysler agreed to issue a $4.59 billion note to VEBA, and also would pay $300 million in 
cash into the trust fund in the years 2010 and 2011.  The cash contribution would increase to $823 million in the 
years 2019 to 2023 (Kellogg and Maher, 2009).  In exchange, the UAW accepted the suspension of cost-of-living-
adjustments (COLA) and limitations on overtime pay with workers receiving overtime pay only after working forty 
hours in a week.  Additionally, Easter Monday holiday, in the years 2010 and 2011, were eliminated (Kellogg and 
Maher, 2009).   
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 These amendments to the 2007 labor agreement were viewed as a way to finalize a planned alliance with 
Italy’s Fiat Spa and to avoid bankruptcy (Stoll and Bennett, 2009).  On April 30, 2009 Chrysler LLC filed for 
bankruptcy protection as court documents revealed that Chrysler LLC lost $16.8 billion in 2008 and anticipated to 
lose $4.7 billion in 2009 (Bray, McLaughlin , and Boudette, 2009). 
 
GENERAL MOTORS  
 
In 2008, GM reported a $30.9 billion loss as revenue declined seventeen percent to $149 billion as 
compared to 2007.  It was also estimated that global vehicle sales fell eleven percent for GM (Terlep, Stoll, and 
King Jr., 2009).  Besides the $13.4 billion loan in December 2009, GM received an additional $4 billion in May 
2009 (Terlep and Shirouzu, 2009).  GM also sought to renegotiate the 2007 labor agreement with the UAW as 
outlined in the bailout loan guidelines established by the federal government. 
 
At the end of May 2009, both GM and the UAW agreed to a “new structuring plan.”  Under the new GM-
UAW deal, GM committed $10 billion to the VEBA fund, with a $2.5 billion note and a $6.5 billion in preferred 
stock.  Additionally, the trust fund would be given a 17.5 % of the “new GM” shares of stock and an option for 
another 2.5% in the future (Stoll, McCracken, and King Jr., 2009).  Other major concessions were similar to those 
granted to Chrysler LLC such as the suspension of COLA, bonuses, and certain holidays (Stoll, McCracken, and 
King Jr., 2009).  Also, the union agreed to additional job buyouts and a ban on strikes until 2015(Terlep, 2009).  The 
new labor agreement was approved by the UAW membership with a seventy-four percent support vote (Stoll, and 
Terlep, 2009).  Despite these cost-saving modifications to the labor agreement, GM filed bankruptcy protection on 
June 1, 2009.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The 2007 labor agreements between the UAW and the Big Three automakers were designed to “usher in a 
new era for the industry.”  These labor contracts were negotiated and driven by the principle that the automakers 
would remain viable and competitive in the global economy while the UAW protected jobs for its membership.  The 
creation and establishment of VEBA as well as a two-tier wage and benefit structure for newly hired workers were 
the cornerstone provisions of these labor pacts. 
 
 Since the ratification of these labor agreements, auto sales and market shares have plunged to record lows 
for the Big Three automakers due to the severity of the global recession.  Both GM and Chrysler LLC received 
bailout loans to an estimated $62 billion; however, both companies filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  When a “new  
GM” emerges from bankruptcy, it will be 60% owned by the U.S. government, and the union health care trust fund 
will own 17.5%.  The company plans to close seventeen plants and eliminate twenty thousand jobs by 2011 (King 
Jr., and Terlep, 2009).  A reorganized Chrysler LLC has completed its alliance with Fiat Spa with the U.S 
government owning 8% of the revamped company, and the UAW retiree health-care fund possessing a 55% stake 
(Bennett and Kellogg, 2009).  Ford Motor has received no bailout loans from the federal government, but has 
requested a $25 billion loan from the U.S. Department of Energy to meet future fuel-efficiency standard.  
Additionally, Ford Motor received $695 million in loan guarantees for Volvo, to be used as part of the europroject to 
reduce emission and energy efficiency in cars (Dolan and Bennett, 2009).  
 
 The Big Three automakers received concessionary agreements from the UAW in order to reduce the so-
called “legacy costs” of the labor and benefits paid to union members established over the years.  With GM and 
Chrysler LLC in bankruptcy, the fate VEBA and pension obligations for the retirees will be determined by a court 
decree.  It was estimated that GM will spend $300 in retiree health care costs per vehicle and its pension fund, 
covering 500,000 retirees, was underfunded by $12 to $13 billion (Helliker, King Jr., and Stoll, 2009).  It is fully 
anticipated that GM and Chrysler LLC will emerge from bankruptcy with a leaner workforce and fewer auto 
dealerships.  The question still remains can the Big Three automakers still afford the wages and benefits it promised 
to the UAW under the modified labor agreements.  Only time will reveal the effectiveness of these concessionary 
agreements; however, the UAW will be limited in reacting to any broken promises by the automakers since it agreed 
not to strike through 2015 under these revised labor agreements. 
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